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a b s t r a c t 
We consider supplier development decisions for prime manufacturers with extensive supply bases pro- 
ducing complex, highly engineered products. We propose a novel modelling approach to support supply 
chain managers decide the optimal level of investment to improve quality performance under uncertainty. 
We develop a Poisson–Gamma model within a Bayesian framework, representing both the epistemic and 
aleatory uncertainties in non-conformance rates. Estimates are obtained to value a supplier quality im- 
provement activity and assess if it is worth gaining more information to reduce epistemic uncertainty. 
The theoretical properties of our model provide new insights about the relationship between the degree 
of epistemic uncertainty, the effectiveness of development programmes, and the levels of investment. We 
find that the optimal level of investment does not have a monotonic relationship with the rate of ef- 
fectiveness. If investment is deferred until epistemic uncertainty is removed then the expected optimal 
investment monotonically decreases as prior variance increases but only if the prior mean is above a 
critical threshold. We develop methods to facilitate practical application of the model to industrial deci- 
sions by a) enabling use of the model with typical data available to major companies and b) developing 
computationally efficient approximations that can be implemented easily. Application to a real indus- 
try context illustrates the use of the model to support practical planning decisions to learn more about 
supplier quality and to invest in improving supplier capability. 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
1. Introduction and industrial motivation 
Our research is motivated by engagement with major manufac- 
turing companies that make complex, high value engineered prod- 
ucts. The companies with which we have collaborated are respon- 
sible for the design, manufacture and assembly of parts but, given 
the nature of their final products, are also systems integrators of 
parts that are procured from global supply chains. The responsi- 
bilities of supply chain management within these organisations in- 
clude selecting and developing suppliers, as well as ensuring a suf- 
ficient supply of parts to the required specification to meet produc- 
tion demands. These supply bases are extensive and often there is 
a long lead time with initial contracting of new suppliers happen- 
ing 3–5 years ahead of the delivery of supplied parts. 
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Company operations are underpinned by large databases con- 
taining information on suppliers (e.g. commodity grouping, tech- 
nology maturity, geographical location), items (e.g. unit price, lead 
time, design ownership), and orders (e.g. volumes, delivery status, 
quality conformance). Routine management reports include data 
analysis to provide information about supplier performance. Com- 
pany cultures encourage and embrace rational analysis for opera- 
tional decision-making. These include decisions to undertake dif- 
ferent kinds of activities for poorly performing suppliers and to 
plan interactions with some suppliers to avoid future problems. 
Supplying parts at the required quality level is fundamental to 
achieve the desired level of performance. Supplier development 
is a costly activity for the companies because it requires deploy- 
ment of skilled personnel for substantial periods of time. The de- 
ployment of such resources requires consideration of the costs and 
effectiveness of activities. It is within this industrial context that 
we seek to help management (1) to assess how much it is worth 
spending to improve supplier quality performance and (2) to un- 
derstand whether there is value in learning more about supplier 
quality capabilities. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.05.044 
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Krause, Handfield, and Scannell (1998) describe supplier devel- 
opment as “any set of activities undertaken by a buying firm to iden- 
tify, measure and improve supplier performance and facilitate the con- 
tinuous improvement of the overall value of goods and services sup- 
plied to the buying company’s business unit”. In considering the two 
challenges posed by our industry problem, we distinguish between 
two types of activity: those that primarily will help us learn more 
about the state of a supplier’s current capabilities, such as plant 
visits, auditing ( Handley & Gray, 2013; Mayer, Nickerson, & Owan, 
2004 ); and those interventions primarily designed to improve sup- 
plier quality, such as supplier training, allocating buyer personnel 
to improve the supplier’s technical base and operations ( Krause, 
Handfield, & Scannell, 1998; Krause, Handfield, & Tyler, 2007 ). We 
can then conceptualise a modelling approach that incorporates a 
two stage decision process, considering how much should be in- 
vested in supplier quality improvement activities and whether it is 
valuable to make an investment now or after learning more about 
the supplier. These decisions are made under uncertainty about the 
true quality level that a supplier will achieve. The degree of un- 
certainty will be influenced by how much experience the buying 
firm has with a supplier. For established suppliers with whom the 
buyer has a long history about quality achieved, the uncertainties 
may be less than for a supplier who is more recently integrated 
into the buying firm’s supply base. 
To build a meaningful model we need to understand the nature 
of uncertainties affecting supplier quality performance. Our general 
model is developed with parameters to reflect quality uncertain- 
ties. A distinctive feature of our approach is that we distinguish 
between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, which relate respec- 
tively to those uncertainties that are regarded as irreducible and 
those that are reducible if more information is collected ( Hoffman 
& Hammonds, 1994 ). Generally, epistemic uncertainty represents 
some degree of ignorance or incomplete information about the sys- 
tem or aspects of the system of interest, and importantly such un- 
certainty can be reduced as information is collected. In contrast, 
aleatory uncertainty describes the inherent random variation that 
is a property of the system and is therefore not considered re- 
ducible ( Bedford & Cooke, 2001 ). In operational quality systems an 
improvement in capability would be realised by a reduction in the 
process variation resulting from a decision to develop a supplier’s 
quality performance ( Kotz & Lovelace, 1998 ). Epistemic uncertainty 
in this context is concerned with the a priori state of knowledge 
about a supplier’s process capability and is expressed before mak- 
ing the decision to develop a supplier or not. Learning by the buyer 
about a supplier’s true quality capability reduces epistemic uncer- 
tainty. 
We develop a stochastic model within a Bayesian framework to 
capture both the epistemic uncertainty associated with true sup- 
plier quality performance as well as the aleatory uncertainty asso- 
ciated with the inherent randomness in a supplier’s performance 
such as that observed in quality performance data. Our approach is 
grounded in the value of information concept that data has value 
if, once analysed, it can result in a change of decision ( Ketzenberg, 
Rosenzweig, Marucheck, & Metters, 2007; Wagner, 1969 ). We con- 
sider value to be a combination of the likelihood of changing a 
decision and the magnitude of its consequence. By formulating an 
appropriate stochastic model we can estimate the uncertainty as- 
sociated with the decision consequences, assign likelihoods to pos- 
sible data and update the stochastic model in view of data. 
We consider a context where we have a dominant prime en- 
tity (the buyer), such as one of the major manufacturers with 
which we work, that relies on an extensive base of suppliers. We 
therefore assume a single buying organisation with multiple sup- 
pliers that have been selected according to the buyer’s standard 
procurement process. Thus, for a new supplier there is insight 
into anticipated quality performance based on evidence from, for 
example, quality process reviews, quality certification, quality 
achieved for similar parts, or first article inspections. For those 
suppliers that have supplied parts to the buyer, data will also ex- 
ist on quality performance achieved historically. Our model is in- 
tended to be most useful for those suppliers whose relationship 
with the buyer is relatively new and for whom a proactive ap- 
proach to development will be taken, for example, during the pe- 
riod between signing a contract and delivery of the regular supply 
of orders. This is because in such cases epistemic uncertainty is 
likely to be greater than for suppliers with whom the relationship 
is more mature. 
We do not consider the choice of activity beyond the two 
classes of development noted above; learning and improvement. 
Our model requires as inputs an expression of the buyer’s assess- 
ment of epistemic uncertainty in the true supplier quality, as well 
as the financial value of production losses that will be incurred by 
the buyer if sub-standard parts are supplied, and an assessment 
of the effectiveness of development activity. The model provides 
the level of the optimal investment in a supplier improvement ac- 
tivity with an upper bound on the amount it is worth spending 
to reduce the epistemic uncertainty about the supplier quality by 
targeting learning activities before investing in improvement. Such 
results help the manager to screen suppliers to assess whether it 
is worth conducting additional plant visits, audits or other learning 
activities first, or whether it is more appropriate to invest directly 
in, for example, training, deployment of buyer resources into the 
supplier, root cause analysis or other activities aimed at directly 
making quality improvements. 
In this study we address the challenge posed by a practi- 
cal industry problem by developing and evaluating an innova- 
tive and applicable modelling solution using a sound mathemat- 
ical methodology. Our principal contribution is a new modelling 
framework for supplier development taking into account the value 
of information. The model is grounded in the theory of decision 
analysis and statistical inference, and is aligned with an important 
industrial supply management problem for which we develop a 
methodology to support implementation with real data. Our model 
addresses gaps in the existing literature in relation to research on 
supplier development and the value of information within a supply 
chain quality management context. The existing literature tends 
largely either to develop mathematical models for assumed scenar- 
ios providing insightful thinking tools, or to discuss the theory and 
practice of supplier development in an operational supply manage- 
ment context. 
We examine the literature relevant to our problem context and 
position our work in relation to existing empirical knowledge and 
models on supplier development in Section 2 . Our scientific mod- 
elling contribution is described in Section 3 . We explain how we 
formulate the stochastic model based on assumptions about the 
probabilistic representation of uncertainties and present a number 
of propositions related to properties of the model. We develop an 
exact solution for the expected value under perfect information, 
which is the limiting case of buying down epistemic uncertainty 
through learning activities. To support practical implementation, 
we derive a computational approximation and evaluate the condi- 
tions under which it is accurate. Section 4 presents an application 
of our model to real, albeit de-sensitised, industry data on supplier 
non-conformance rates for a set of key tier 1 suppliers to a large 
industrial prime. We present an empirical Bayes method to esti- 
mate the prior distribution representing the epistemic uncertainty 
in supplier performance using typical data contained in industry 
databases. After discussing the reasonableness of our assumptions 
given the industry problem and data, we present a selection of 
ways in which the findings of our model can be communicated 
to supply chain managers. Section 5 presents our conclusions and 
discusses the implications of our findings for practice and theory, 
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including identifying future challenges and opportunities for fur- 
ther work. 
2. Positioning within scientific literature 
Our research relates to several strands of the supply chain man- 
agement and decision sciences literatures. We briefly review semi- 
nal studies on supplier development in order to position our mod- 
elling approach appropriately within this context. We critically re- 
view those studies that focus on modelling the value of informa- 
tion in supply chains with a particular emphasis on the treatment 
of uncertainties. 
2.1. Supplier development 
Krause, Handfield, and Scannell (1998) , Che and Hausch (1999) , 
and Krause, Handfield, and Tyler (2007) provide detailed accounts 
of supplier development approaches in practice. In particular, 
Krause, Handfield, and Scannell (1998) present a general represen- 
tation of a supplier development process grounded in an extensive 
industry survey. From our contemporary company engagement, the 
identified process still typifies many aspects of current practice. For 
example, critical commodities and suppliers are identified, key per- 
formance areas are targeted, appropriate teams are formed, and ac- 
tivities are selected, implemented and reviewed. Interestingly, one 
step in the general process notes that “opportunities and probability 
for improvement” through supplier development should be identi- 
fied. However, no further consideration is given as to how such 
probabilities should be expressed, although criteria such as the po- 
tential to influence the supplier development process, resources re- 
quired in terms of people and time, as well as the potential re- 
turn on investment are discussed. Krause, Handfield, and Scannell 
(1998) pose the question “what criteria should be used to identify 
suppliers that have high probability of development success?”. Our 
model helps to answer this question by estimating the value of 
gaining more information about supplier quality and providing a 
probabilistic assessment of the risks of such investments, given the 
degree of epistemic uncertainty, as well as the buyer’s assessment 
of the potential to develop the supplier. 
Krause, Handfield, and Scannell (1998) classify supplier devel- 
opment activities into reactive and strategic approaches. Reactive 
approaches are the first stage in the development process where 
investment is made into poorly performing suppliers to undertake 
corrective actions. Strategic supplier development, on the other 
hand, is applied at a more advanced stage where the buyer devel- 
ops a strategic plan for the supply base to increase the long-term 
capability of the supply network. We position our approach in be- 
tween these extremes, essentially as a tuned proactive approach, 
which estimates the value of collecting further information on sup- 
plier capability in order to mitigate the risk of poor quality and 
avoid extensive exposure to risks of a supplier failing to perform. 
Supply chain managers are interested in multiple performance 
measures; Ward, McCreery, Ritzman, and Sharma (1998) high- 
light four priorities — quality, delivery, flexibility and cost. Krause, 
Handfield, and Tyler (2007) note that quality has been recognised 
as important in manufacturing since the 1980s and continues to be 
of considerable concern since end customer perceptions of the final 
product quality will be impacted by the quality of parts manufac- 
tured by suppliers. They find that performance outcomes in qual- 
ity, as well as delivery and flexibility, are affected by direct involve- 
ment of the buyer’s personnel in supplier development. Hence, 
deciding how much to invest in interventions aimed at improv- 
ing supplier quality remains an important business challenge more 
generally beyond our motivating industrial problem. 
Supplier development has been previously investigated in sev- 
eral modelling studies. Based on the primary methodology used, 
we classify the literature into (1) game theoretical studies and (2) 
stochastic modelling approaches. 
Most game theoretical studies focus on strategic supplier de- 
velopment for production cost reduction ( Bernstein & Kok, 2009; 
Iida, 2007; Iyer, Schwarz, & Zenios, 2005; Kim & Netessine, 2013; 
Qi, Hyun-Soo, & Amitabh, 2015 ). For instance, Bernstein and Kok 
(2009) consider cost reduction investments of suppliers in an as- 
sembly network where the effectiveness of cost-contingent and 
target-price contracts in promoting investments and increasing 
profits is analysed. Similarly, Iida (2007) considers an assembly 
network where both the buyer and the suppliers might invest in 
cost reduction, showing that effort compensation and cost sharing 
agreements can enable supply chain coordination. Although cost 
reduction effort may be interpreted as a means to satisfy certain 
quality requirements, quality is not given explicit consideration in 
these studies. More related to our approach is the study by Zhu, 
Zhang, and Tsung (2007) that explicitly investigates the improve- 
ment of a supplier’s quality where both the buyer and the sup- 
plier can invest to decrease the non-conformance rate, showing 
that investment by only the party with higher investment effec- 
tiveness is sufficient unless there are resource constraints. Our re- 
search differs from these game theoretical studies in two ways. 
First, we consider the problem from the buyer’s perspective be- 
cause we adopt a client decision support focus. Second, our ap- 
proach is based on real-world data, both empirical and judgemen- 
tal. In contrast, game-theoretical studies in the literature are more 
general and make idealistic assumptions in particular regarding 
uncertainty, as we explore further below. 
Stochastic programming has been used to study supplier de- 
velopment in a more limited number of studies ( Friedl & Wag- 
ner, 2012; Wang, Gilland, & Tomlin, 2010 ). For instance, Wang, 
Gilland, and Tomlin (2010) use a two-stage stochastic program- 
ming framework where in the first stage the buyer selects the in- 
vestment levels, and based on their returns, which are subject to 
variation, the order quantities are selected. Of more interest to our 
problem, Talluri, Narasimhan, and Chung (2010) and Hosseininasab 
and Ahmadi (2015) study strategic supplier development using 
Markowitz-type mean-variance risk models to formulate the op- 
timal levels of investment in a set of suppliers. Hosseininasab and 
Ahmadi (2015) note the importance of taking into account future 
performance and anticipated changes in the development of sup- 
pliers. They also discuss the use of databases to identify trends and 
correlations in supplier performance although they use only syn- 
thetically generated data for supplier quality, delivery, price and 
financial position. Our approach differs from these studies in sev- 
eral ways. First, we consider only quality, unlike authors who fo- 
cus on multiple performance measures, see, for example, the re- 
view by Ho, Xu, and Dey (2010) . Second, our model provides the 
expected return on investment in quality improvement as an out- 
put, rather than using it as a model input. Third, as mentioned 
for game-theoretic models, we use real data rather than synthet- 
ically generated data. Fourth, we consider a stochastic modelling 
framework to account for the potential reduction of epistemic un- 
certainty, which is not captured in Markowitz-type models. 
2.2. Value of information 
The established concept of value of information (VOI) in 
decision analysis is predicated on the ability of additional infor- 
mation to reduce epistemic uncertainty. Since Wagner (1969) , 
much has been written about VOI. In the context of inventory 
management in particular, the value of sharing information about 
customer demand, forecasts, inventory level, and production ca- 
pacity for supply chain coordination, cost reduction, and bullwhip 
effect mitigation has been widely investigated; see reviews by 
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Sahin and Robinson (2002) and Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig, 
Marucheck, and Metters (2007) . 
In their survey article on inventory management, Ketzenberg, 
Rosenzweig, Marucheck, and Metters (2007) describe VOI as the 
marginal improvement in value through additional use of infor- 
mation relative to some base scenario, where the base scenario 
represents a given set of information that can be compared to 
the value gained from the so-called information scenario, which 
is structurally identical to the base scenario except that additional 
information is shared. The authors argue there is growing inter- 
est in VOI because of the increasing opportunities to gain more 
information due to the growth in e-commerce. They discuss differ- 
ent sources of uncertainty, distinguished as random and system- 
atic, which relate to the stochastic and structural characteristics 
of the system and so could be considered equivalent to aleatory 
and epistemic uncertainties, respectively. More generally, much has 
been written about uncertainty in supply chain management with 
different classifications being proposed; see, for example, the re- 
view by Simangunsong, Hendry, and Stevenson (2012) . 
Interestingly, Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig, Marucheck, and Metters 
(2007) also formulate several propositions about VOI in an inven- 
tory management context. Of most relevance to us are the fol- 
lowing, which we paraphrase as follows: (1) VOI is higher when 
there is greater uncertainty and (2) VOI is higher when there is in- 
creased responsiveness. Based on a regression analysis of the em- 
pirical data extracted from their literature review, strong support is 
found for the second and partial support for the first proposition. 
In our concluding discussions, we reflect upon these propositions 
with regard to our modelling theory and application in a quality 
management context. 
The supply chain quality management literature contains arti- 
cles that focus upon decision models related to supplier quality 
and include the treatment of uncertainty. In the agency settings 
of such studies, one or both parties involved in a buyer-supplier 
relation might benefit from hiding private information, leading to 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems. In such settings the 
other party needs to provide incentives to establish coordination 
or incur an information ‘rent’ to reveal the hidden information. 
As discussed above in the context of supplier development, Zhu, 
Zhang, and Tsung (2007) build a model to determine which invest- 
ment options in quality improvement are optimal for both parties 
when buyer production is outsourced to a supplier. Aleatory uncer- 
tainty in the supplier quality control process is modelled in terms 
of the non-conformance rate and the quality costs incurred by both 
the supplier and the buyer are explicated. Although the relative 
states of knowledge of the buyer and supplier are acknowledged, 
no consideration is given to the articulation of such epistemic un- 
certainty as a probability distribution. 
In contrast, Lim (2001) and Corbett, Zhou, and Tang (2004) dis- 
cuss the explicit mathematical representation of uncertainties as 
prior probabilities in the context of buyer-supplier contracting de- 
cisions. Neither study uses the term epistemic uncertainty, but 
the concept is clear from the explicit consideration given to ex- 
ante views of buyers and the use of prior probability distributions 
within the models. Lim (2001) develops a buyer decision model 
for contract option selections when there is uncertainty in supplier 
quality; expressing a prior probability on the supplier’s technology 
type to provide a probabilistic assessment of the fraction of de- 
fective parts anticipated to be supplied to the buyer. The increas- 
ing role of e-commerce data as a motivation for such modelling is 
identified, with the authors commenting that the visibility of part 
quality data afforded by shared database systems can impact the 
degree of information asymmetry between the buyer and the sup- 
plier. This observation is contextually important for our problem. 
Corbett, Zhou, and Tang (2004) assume a bilateral buyer- 
supplier monopoly within which they examine scenarios to assess 
VOI of multiple contract types. They assume the supplier holds a 
prior distribution that expresses her uncertainty about the buyer’s 
internal variable costs. The decision model is developed for a gen- 
eral prior distribution represented by a continuous probability dis- 
tribution function, although numerical experiments examine vari- 
ous distributional forms of the assumed prior as a form of sensi- 
tivity analysis. Different parameter value sets are selected to inves- 
tigate the effects of controlling the degree of change in the prior 
mean and variance. Thus, they are, in effect, exploring the effects 
of different degrees of epistemic uncertainty on their decisions. 
We adopt an equivalent approach, although we explore sensitivity 
to changes in the degree of epistemic uncertainty expressed using 
real data. 
While different ways of mathematically representing prior 
probabilities have been articulated by Lim (2001) and especially 
by Corbett, Zhou, and Tang (2004) , there has been no considera- 
tion of how such distributions might be specified in an industrial 
decision-making context. We show how typically available industry 
data can be used to form meaningful, rather than assumed, prior 
distributions to represent epistemic uncertainty. 
3. A modelling framework for valuing supplier development 
Our modelling concept is illustrated using a decision tree 
shown in Fig. 1 . The buyer needs to choose whether or not to in- 
vest in activities to improve supplier quality (upper two branches) 
or whether to gather more information to learn about supplier 
quality capability before investing in improvement activities (lower 
branch). The decision tree is a visual simplification with a binary 
(good or poor) representation of supplier quality. Our full model 
considers the occurrence of poor quality events that risk delaying 
or disrupting supply to the buyer as measured by the number of 
non-conformances within some period of buyer exposure to risk. 
The exposure to risk could be measured by, for example, the calen- 
dar time or the number of parts ordered from the supplier. We at- 
tach a probability distribution to the uncertainties associated with 
supplier quality. Not shown in the diagram are the buyer valua- 
tions associated with each decision pathway, which we measure as 
the buyer’s loss due to poor supplier quality. The model allows us 
to determine the highest amount the buyer be prepared to spend 
in the time window between contracting the new supplier and de- 
livery of orders to learn more about a supplier to reduce epistemic 
uncertainty about the true quality performance. Hence it supports 
the manager in assessing whether it is worth learning more be- 
fore making choices about improvement activities, or whether it is 
better to make improvement decisions in light of the current state 
of knowledge. If the latter option is deemed more worthy, then 
the model further allows the manager to decide whether to invest, 
or not, in improvement activities and also how much it is worth 
spending to improve supplier quality should this option be chosen. 
3.1. Modelling assumptions about the stochastic nature of uncertainty 
Let N denote the random variable, number of non- 
conformances, and let t denote the exposure to risk of non- 
conformances to the buyer. We assume that the mean number 
of non-conformances is proportional to the exposure to risk. We 
model N as a Poisson random variable with parameter , which 
denotes the non-conformance rate in proportion to exposure. 
Exposure may be measured on a continuous (e.g. time) or discrete 
(e.g. order size) scale. When exposure is measured by a continuous 
metric then a Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) is rather than 
as a special case of our model. The Poisson model is the simplest 
model for the number of non-conformances that is both popular in 
the literature ( Montgomery, 2013 ) and is reasonable for our empir- 
ical data, as we shall show in Section 4 . The aleatory uncertainty 
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Fig. 1. Model concept as a simplified decision tree of buyer decisions ( ) and supplier quality uncertainties ( ) . 
representing the natural variation in the non-conformance rate is 
modelled by the Poisson probability distribution conditioned on 
knowing  = λ as in Eq. (3.1) . 
P ( N = n |  = λ) = 
( λt ) 
n 
e −λt 
n ! 
, t > 0 , λ > 0 , n = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . (3.1) 
Practically, we shall not precisely know a supplier’s true non- 
conformance rate, and so we describe our epistemic uncertainty 
on the value of this parameter, λ, through a prior probability dis- 
tribution, denoted by π ( λ). We assume π ( λ) can be described by 
a Gamma distribution as shown in Eq. (3.2) . The Gamma distribu- 
tion is a conjugate prior to the Poisson model and hence is math- 
ematically tractable giving it popularity as the Poisson–Gamma 
model ( Carlin & Louis, 2009 ). More importantly, the Gamma dis- 
tribution with shape and scale parameters, α and β , respectively, 
provides a flexible family of distributional shapes through which 
epistemic uncertainty can be expressed probabilistically. 
π ( λ) = 
βαλα−1 e −βλ
Ŵ( α) 
, α > 0 , β > 0 , λ > 0 . (3.2) 
If new data becomes available in the form of n 0 observed non- 
conformance events for a risk exposure of t 0 then, using Bayes The- 
orem, we can update the prior in Eq. (3.2) with the new data to 
obtain the posterior distribution. This will also be in the form of a 
Gamma distribution with a change in parameters as shown in Eq. 
(3.3) . 
π ( λ| n 0 , t 0 ) = 
( β + t 0 ) 
αλα+ n 0 −1 e −( β+ t 0 ) λ
Ŵ( α + n 0 ) 
, 
α > 0 , β > 0 , λ > 0 , t 0 > 0 , n 0 = 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . (3.3) 
The prior in Eq. (3.2) represents our epistemic uncertainty 
about the true supplier quality given our knowledge of that sup- 
plier to date. Our future experience with the supplier will result 
in a new prior, which is effectively the posterior distribution ex- 
pressed in Eq. (3.3) . Intuitively, as we gain more knowledge of 
the supplier, our epistemic uncertainty should reduce. Asymptot- 
ically as t 0 approaches ∞ , our epistemic uncertainty approaches 
zero, because we shall have learnt everything about the true non- 
conformance rate and so we are left only with the natural random 
variation described in Eq. (3.1) . 
3.2. Specification of a prior distribution 
As noted above, the prior distribution represents the buyer’s 
epistemic uncertainty about the true non-conformance rate of an 
individual supplier of interest. If several suppliers are candidates 
for development by the buyer, then each supplier will be modelled 
individually. Although we assume the prior comes from a common 
family of Gamma distributions, the buyer’s epistemic uncertainty 
about each individual supplier is represented by specifying appro- 
priate parameter values for that supplier. 
Alternative modelling tactics can be adopted to specify a prior 
distribution for a supplier. A prior can be constructed empiri- 
cally. For example, Quigley and Walls (2017) describe a general 
structured process for eliciting the domain knowledge of an ex- 
pert, such as a supply chain manager, to define reference factors 
upon which relevant empirical data from existing suppliers can be 
matched to the supplier of interest and subsequently verified as 
an expression of the epistemic uncertainty in that supplier’s true 
non-conformance rate. In this situation, the parameters of the 
Gamma prior distribution require to be estimated statistically. 
We show how this is accomplished using standard approaches in 
the context of our industry example. Alternatively, the subjective 
judgement of the buyer can be elicited using a structured expert 
judgement process to express the buyer’s epistemic uncertainty 
in the supplier true non-conformance rate ( O’Hagan et al., 2006; 
Quigley, Bedford, & Walls, 2008 ). A subjective prior distribution is 
appropriate if the expert believes s/he has more information than 
is contained in the relevant empirical data. 
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In the subsequent steps of our modelling framework, a prior 
distribution is treated in the same way regardless of whether it 
has been constructed empirically or subjectively. 
3.3. Optimal investment in supplier quality improvement activity 
Let x denote the level of investment in supplier quality im- 
provement, where the anticipated benefit is better capability and 
reduced non-conformance. Let v denote the loss incurred by the 
buyer from a single non-conformance, i.e. the unit cost of internal 
quality failure to the buyer. Here, we consider v to be an exogenous 
parameter that needs to be estimated by the buyer. Porter and 
Rayner (1992) and Schiffauerova and Thomson (2006) provide gen- 
eral reviews on the costs of quality. Following Nandakumar, Datar, 
and Akella (1993) , in quantifying v consideration should be given 
to penalties for production delays due to unavailable or unsuitable 
parts, inventory holding costs for other parts used in lieu of non- 
conforming parts, costs for rescheduling and switch-over to other 
orders, and demand side costs of loss of goodwill, such as customer 
defection and loss of potential future customers, due to the delays, 
and so on. 
To associate the supplier investment level with the supplier 
performance, we define γ as a measure of the effectiveness rate of 
the improvement activity, where higher effectiveness is reflected 
in larger values of γ . We consider a diminishing marginal return 
of investment in the reduction of non-conformances. We employ 
the mathematical formulation used by Porteus (1986) and Zhu, 
Zhang, and Tsung (2007) , where the non-conformance rate reduces 
at a fraction that decreases exponentially with increasing level of 
investment. Namely, if the number of non-conformances is N in 
the absence of a development investment, it is expected to de- 
crease to Ne −γ x when x monetary units are invested and the ef- 
fectiveness rate is γ . The effectiveness of a development activity 
will depend upon, for example, the type and nature of improve- 
ment considered, the familiarity of the buyer with the range of 
parts supplied and production technologies used, and the nature 
of the relationship between the buyer and the supplier in ad- 
dition to the commitment of the particular supplier; these need 
to be reflected in the value chosen for the parameter γ . In this 
paper we focus upon modelling the epistemic uncertainty in the 
non-conformance rate because we wish to apply our model us- 
ing operational data available to the buyer. The effectiveness rate 
parameter is represented as a single value, although as we show 
in our industry example, the sensitivity of results to changes in 
the specified rate of effectiveness can be examined. Future exten- 
sions of our univariate stochastic model could accommodate mod- 
elling of epistemic uncertainties on multiple parameters at the 
cost of increased model complexity, computational and elicitation 
burdens. 
Let P denote the profit function expressed as the difference be- 
tween the value associated with a reduction in the number of non- 
conformances through the improvement activity, and the invest- 
ment level, x , required to undertake the supplier quality improve- 
ment, as shown in Eq. (3.4) . The initial term represents the reduc- 
tion in buyer loss due to non-conformances before ( v N) and after 
( v Ne −γ x ) quality improvement. 
P = v N 
(
1 − e −γ x 
)
− x. (3.4) 
To obtain the optimal level of investment, we evaluate the ex- 
pected profit when epistemic uncertainty is represented by the 
Gamma prior distribution in Eq. (3.2) . That is, we are consider- 
ing the prior information scenario associated with the top two 
branches of Fig. 1 . The expected profit function derived is given 
in Eq. (3.5) . 
E [ P ] = v 
α
β
t 
(
1 − e −γ x 
)
− x. (3.5) 
Table 1 
Interpretation of elasticity ( ǫ) in terms of effectiveness 
rate ( γ ) and optimal investment ( x ∗). 
Elasticity Impact of percentage increase in γ
ǫ ≤ −1 Decrease in x ∗ of at least a percent 
−1 < ǫ < 0 Decrease in x ∗ less than a percent 
ǫ = 0 No change in x ∗
0 < ǫ < 1 Increase in x ∗ less than a percent 
ǫ = 1 Increase in x ∗ of a percent 
ǫ > 1 Increase in x ∗ of greater than a percent 
The product of parameters v t in the expected profit given in Eq. 
(3.5) measures the exposure of the buyer to the benefit of the in- 
vestment. Consistent with the formulation of the Poisson model, t 
could be measured by, for example, the number of parts ordered 
from the supplier or the duration of projects for which it is antic- 
ipated that the supplier will work with the buyer, and the cost to 
the buyer of each non-conforming part is v . This parametric formu- 
lation can also accommodate a Net Present Value (NPV) weighting 
of future benefits as we show in Appendix A . The optimal invest- 
ment level, x ∗, of the expected profit function is given in Eq. (3.6) . 
x ∗ = max 
( 
0 , 
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
)
γ
) 
. (3.6) 
From Eq. (3.6) we can make several observations. First, sufficiently 
low levels of effectiveness will result in zero investment in supplier 
improvement activity (middle branch of Fig. 1 ). Second, and less 
obvious, the optimal investment level does not have a monotonic 
relationship with the effectiveness rate. This leads us to formulate 
Proposition 1 . The proof is given in Appendix B . 
Proposition 1. The elasticity, denoted by ǫ, of optimal investment 
(x ∗) with respect to the effectiveness rate ( γ )—the ratio of the per- 
centage change in x ∗ with respect to the percentage change in γ—can 
be expressed as: 
ε = 
1 
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
) − 1 . 
Implying that if: 
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
)
> 1 , 
then an increase in the effectiveness rate will result in a decrease in 
optimal investment. 
Table 1 summarises the interpretation of elasticity. Expressions 
for the expected profit at x ∗ can be obtained through substitution 
of Eq. (3.6) into Eq. (3.5) to obtain Eq. (3.7) . Note that Eq. (3.7) pro- 
vides an expectation, whereas the actual future outcome will vary 
as illustrated in Fig. 1 . 
E [ P ; x ∗] = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎩ 
v tγ α
β
− 1 − ln 
(
v tγ α
β
)
γ
if v tγ
α
β
> 1 
0 if v tγ
α
β
≤ 1 
(3.7) 
3.4. Assessing worth of learning before investing based on expected 
value of perfect information 
To provide the buyer with a useful means of assessing whether 
there is value in activities to learn more about supplier quality we 
compute the expected profit under an assumption of perfect infor- 
mation. Expected value under perfect information (EVPI) does not 
indicate how much should be invested in a particular quality im- 
provement investment, which was described in Section 3.3 . Rather, 
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estimating EVPI guides managers on how much it is worth spend- 
ing to buy down epistemic uncertainty about the supplier’s true 
non-conformance rate before investing in an improvement activity. 
Specifically, computing the expected value of information as the 
difference between the EVPI and the expected profit without per- 
fect information provides an assessment of how much it is worth 
spending, at most, to remove all epistemic uncertainty, and hence 
provides an upper bound on the amount it would cost to reduce 
uncertainty if information gained was partial and imperfect. This 
captures the lower branch of Fig. 1 . 
For the supplier’s true non-conformance rate, , we can deter- 
mine the optimal investment decision under perfect information, 
which we denote by X PI as it is a function of the random variable 
. Eq. (3.8) provides an expression for the expected value of profit 
under perfect information given our modelling assumptions stated 
in Section 3.1 . 
E [ P | x ∗ = X PI ] = 
{
v t γ−1 −ln ( v t γ) 
γ if v tγ > 1 
0 if v tγ ≤ 1 
(3.8) 
Since the true supplier non-conformance rate is not known we 
take the expectation of Eq. (3.8) with respect to  using the prior 
distribution given in Eq. (3.2) . Proposition 2 gives an analytic ex- 
pression for the EVPI. The proof is shown in Appendix B . 
Proposition 2. For the Poisson probability distribution given in Eq. 
(3.1) with a Gamma prior distribution for true non-conformance rate 
given in Eq. (3.2) and the objective function of form shown in Eq. 
(3.5) , then the Expected Value under Perfect Information (EVPI) can 
be expressed as shown in Eq. (3.9) . 
EVPI = 
v tγ α
β
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + 1 , β
v tγ
))
− 1 + F 
(
1 ;α, β
v tγ
)
γ
+ 
∞ ∑ 
i =1 
i ∑ 
j=0 
( i −1 ) ! 
( i − j ) ! j! ( −1 ) 
j 
(
v tγ
β
) j Ŵ( α+ j ) 
Ŵ( α) 
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + j, β
v tγ
))
γ
(3.9) 
where F 
(
1 ;α + j, β
v tγ
)
is the cumulative distribution function of a 
Gamma distribution evaluated at 1 with shape parameter (α + j) and 
scale parameter β
v tγ given by 
F 
(
1 ;α + j, 
β
v tγ
)
= 
( β
v tγ ) 
α+ j e 
β
v tγ
Ŵ(α + j) 
∞ ∑ 
k =0 
( β
v tγ ) 
k ∏ k 
k 1 =0 
(α + j + k 1 ) 
. 
Computing the expected value of perfect information (i.e. 
EVPI − E [ P ; x ∗] ) allows us to obtain an upper bound on how much 
it is worth spending to learn more about a supplier before in- 
vesting in quality improvement. If this difference is less than 
the expected cost of obtaining the supplier information, then Eq. 
(3.6) can be used to support the buyer decision to invest, or 
not, in supplier improvement (first or second branch from top in 
Fig. 1 ). Otherwise, the buyer obtains more information first to buy 
down epistemic uncertainty by learning more about supplier qual- 
ity (lowest branch in Fig. 1 ). 
3.5. Sensitivity of optimal investment to prior variance 
It is interesting to explore how the optimal investment in sup- 
plier quality improvement under perfect information, X PI , responds 
to changes in the degree of epistemic uncertainty. We use the 
prior standard deviation as a summary measure of epistemic un- 
certainty. Note also that re-expressing the parameters of the prior 
distribution in terms of the mean and standard deviation can be 
useful when communicating results to managers since they are 
more understandable. 
Theorem 1 below shows that for situations where the true 
non-conformance rate is above the investment threshold, that is 
 > 1 υtγ , the mean optimal level of investment under perfect in- 
formation is a monotonically decreasing function of the epistemic 
uncertainty associated with the non-conformance rate. The proof 
is shown in Appendix C . We note that the proof does not require 
the prior to have the form of a Gamma distribution. 
Theorem 1. If the non-conformance rate is greater than the min- 
imum investment threshold, i.e.  > 1 υtγ , then for a fixed mean 
non-conformance rate μ
> 1 υtγ
= E 
[

∣∣ > 1 υtγ ], the expected opti- 
mal investment under perfect information is monotonically decreas- 
ing with respect to non-conformance uncertainty, i.e. σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
= 
V ar 
[

∣∣ > 1 υtγ ]. Specifically, ∂E 
[ 
X PI 
∣∣∣> 1 υtγ ] 
∂σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
< 0 . 
3.6. Approximation for EVPI and computational accuracy 
Proposition 2 provides an expression for EVPI in terms of a 
cumulative Gamma distribution function. However, calculating the 
EVPI using Eq. (3.9) requires a degree of programming knowl- 
edge, which might hinder the practical use of the method. Hence 
Proposition 3 below gives an upper bound approximation for the 
EVPI to facilitate easier application in, for example, spreadsheets. 
We can also obtain a bound on the error between the true EVPI 
and its upper bound, as shown in Proposition 4 , and thus obtain a 
lower bound on the EVPI. Proofs to both propositions are shown in 
Appendix B . 
Proposition 3. The following expression provides an upper bound 
(UB) for the EVPI expressed in Eq. (3.9) : 
EVPI ≤ v t 
α
β
−
( α) − ln 
(
β
v tγ
)
γ
−
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, 
β
v tγ
))
(3.10) 
where  is the digamma function. 
Proposition 4. The error between the upper bound on the EVPI (UB) 
(Eq. (3.10) ) and the actual EVPI (Eq. (3.9) ) can be bounded as fol- 
lows: 
v t 
α
β
−
( α) − ln 
(
β
v tγ
)
γ
−
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, 
β
v tγ
))
− EV PI 
≤
(
β
v tγ
)α
Ŵ( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e −
β
v tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e −
β
v tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) . 
(3.11) 
We can characterise the parameter regions where the UB is a 
good approximation for the EVPI. That is, where the right-hand- 
side of Eq. (3.11) is sufficiently small. Note that the bound in Eq. 
(3.11) is not a monotonic function of α. Corollary 1 establishes the 
limits of this bound for either α or β when the other is held fixed, 
showing that the EVPI converges to the UB in these limits for large 
α or small β . 
Corollary 1. For the limits of the error in the upper bound with re- 
spect to α and β , the shape and scale parameters of the Gamma prior 
distribution respectively, are zero for large α and small β . i.e.: 
lim 
β→ 0 
(
β
v tγ
)α
Ŵ( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e −
β
v tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e −
β
v tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) = 0 
lim 
α→∞ 
(
β
v tγ
)α
Ŵ( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e −
β
v tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e −
β
v tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e −
β
v tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) = 0 
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Fig. 2. Process showing relation between inputs and outputs when modelling a new supplier. Dotted lines show an alternative path when modelling an existing supplier. 
The accuracy of the UB as an approximation for the actual EVPI 
is assessed in Appendix C for a range of parameter values for α and 
β . Our results show that the accuracy of the UB increases as the 
shape parameter α increases, which is consistent with Corollary 1 . 
In addition, its accuracy also increases for increasing values 
of the effectiveness rate γ and decreasing values of the scale 
parameter β . 
4. Industry example 
Fig. 2 summarises our general modelling framework and we 
now discuss its application to a real industry problem for a large 
manufacturing company making highly engineered heavy machin- 
ery. The company has an extensive in-bound supply base. Lead 
times can be long for new projects since initial contracting de- 
cisions with critical suppliers can be made several years ahead. 
During the time period before parts arrive, the company faces 
the ‘buyer’s dilemma’ addressed by our modelling framework. 
The core decision problems are whether or not to invest in ac- 
tivities to improve quality or whether to invest in activities to 
learn more about a supplier’s quality. This dilemma is particu- 
larly acute for suppliers that are newly integrated into the buying 
company’s supply base and for whom there may be little empiri- 
cal evidence about the required part quality since initial contract- 
ing and procurement information is limited to checks on certifica- 
tion, quality processes, and previous quality outcomes for related 
products. 
4.1. Setting model parameters 
A modelling choice needs to be made about the approach 
adopted to specify the prior distribution expressing the buyer’s 
uncertainty of the new supplier’s true non-conformance rate. In 
this study, the manager is able to construct a suitable compara- 
tor pool of existing suppliers based on reference factors elicited 
following the methodology of Quigley and Walls (2017) . Moreover, 
the records taken from the company ERP system provide relevant 
non-conformance data for the suppliers in the comparator pool. 
Therefore, we elect to construct an empirical prior distribution in 
this case. The steps in estimating the empirical prior distribution 
are described in Section 4.2 . 
The model also requires as inputs an assessment of the effec- 
tiveness of the improvement activity and an estimate of the loss 
incurred by the manufacturer if non-conforming parts are sup- 
plied. In this study, we investigate the impact of setting differ- 
ent effectiveness rates on decision-making to cover a range of de- 
grees of effectiveness for different types of improvement activi- 
ties, the buyer’s familiarity with the supplier, the parts and tech- 
nologies used, and different levels of supplier engagement. For the 
purposes of this example, we set the buyer loss to be one unit 
per non-conformance occurrence, i.e. v = 1 , to de-sensitise the cost 
valuations. 
4.2. Estimating an empirical prior distribution 
We use empirical data from company databases on the annual 
frequencies of non-conforming parts recorded over several years 
for a comparator pool of 35 suppliers. To estimate the parame- 
ters of the prior distribution using the selected data we adopt a 
method, known as empirical Bayes, which has been used in a sim- 
ilar manner in technical risk analysis ( Quigley, Bedford, & Walls, 
2007; Quigley, Hardman, Bedford, & Walls, 2011 ) and also more 
generally ( Carlin & Louis, 2009 ). 
In order to obtain the Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE) 
of the prior distribution’s parameters, we require an expression 
for the predictive distribution that explains the relationship be- 
tween the observed data and the prior parameters ( Good, 1976 ). 
Eq. (4.1) shows the predictive distribution as a Negative Binomial 
distribution, where N i denotes the number of non-conforming 
parts for supplier i and t i represents the exposure to risk for sup- 
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Fig. 3. (a) Joint 95% confidence region for the empirical prior mean and standard deviation of the true number of non-conforming parts per annum. (b) P–P plot of the 
predictive distribution against the empirical distribution. 
plier i , which in this example is 1 year. We justify this choice 
of exposure because we want to relate the supply risk to the 
buyer’s manufacturing projects and so consider the implications 
when parts may not be available for assembly of the engineering 
product. The remaining notation is the same as in Section 3 . 
P ( N i = n i ) = 
∞ ∫ 
0 
( λi t i ) 
n i e −λi k i 
n i ! 
βαλi 
α−1 
e −βλi 
Ŵ( α) 
dλ
= 
Ŵ( n i + α) 
Ŵ( α) n i ! 
(
β
β + t i 
)α(
t i 
β + t i 
)n i 
, 
α > 0 , β > 0 , n i = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . (4.1) 
Using the predictive distribution we construct the log-likelihood 
function for the data across the pool of 35 suppliers as follows: 
l ( α, β) ∝ 
35 ∑ 
i =1 
[
d i + α ln 
(
β
β + t i 
)
+ n i 
(
t i 
β + t i 
)]
where d i = 
⎧ ⎨ 
⎩ 
n i −1 ∑ 
j=0 
ln ( j + α) , if n i ≥ 1 
0 if n i = 0 . 
We obtain the MLE of the parameters of the empirical prior to 
be ˆ α = 0 . 0879 and ˆ β = 0 . 0018 . Construction of joint confidence re- 
gions for the prior parameters are obtained using likelihood theory 
( Lawless, 2003 ). Here, we re-parameterise the prior parameters to 
express them in terms of the pool mean non-conformance rate ( μ) 
and standard deviation ( σ ), which we find are more directly under- 
standable in reasoning about the meaning of the empirical prior 
distribution with supply chain managers. Fig. 3 (a) illustrates the 
95% joint confidence region showing strong association between 
the prior mean and standard deviation, which are 48.83 and 164.71 
for this data set, respectively. The mean number of non-conforming 
parts per annum in the pool is not likely to exceed 400 and the 
standard deviation in the non-conformance frequency is not likely 
to be greater than 1400. 
Now that we have estimated the prior distribution, we can as- 
sess the validity of our modelling assumptions. Fig. 3 (b) shows a 
P–P plot to assess the fit of the estimated predictive distribution 
model to the empirical data. There is a good fit in both extremes 
of the distribution, although there are values below the 45 degree 
reference line in the centre indicating that the model is more con- 
servative than the data in this region. However the fit is good in 
the upper right hand tail, which is important in our risk analysis 
since this is the high consequence situation where the true sup- 
plier non-conformance rate may be relatively high. 
We now use the empirical prior distribution as a probability 
model representing the epistemic uncertainty in the true non- 
conformance rate of the new supplier of interest. This Gamma 
prior probability distribution function is shown in Fig. 4 (a) and 
indicates a high probability the true non-conformance rate will 
be low, but the right tail in the distribution implies there re- 
mains a relatively lower chance the true non-conformance rate of 
the new supplier will be high. Using the MLE, ˆ α = 0 . 0879 and 
ˆ β = 0 . 0018 , we can update the uncertainty associated with the 
true non-conformance rate to obtain the predictive distribution 
for the new supplier in the form of a Negative Binomial distribu- 
tion with parameters ( ˆ  α + n i , ˆ β + t i ) . Since we only have informa- 
tion from assessments obtained at initial contracting for the new 
supplier, we have no data on the number of non-conformances 
(i.e. n i = t i = 0 ). Fig. 4 (b) shows this predictive distribution for the 
number of non-conforming parts per annum conditional on the oc- 
currence of at least one such event. The conditional distribution al- 
lows us to illustrate the thick tail of the distribution which would 
otherwise be dominated by the outcome of zero non-conformances 
since this probability is estimated to be 0.57 for this data set. The 
decay of the tail of this conditional distribution is slow, implying 
that there is a significant risk of many non-conforming parts being 
delivered by the new supplier given our current state of knowledge 
about quality obtained from the pool. 
4.3. Optimal investment in supplier quality improvement 
So, how much should the company be willing to invest to im- 
prove the quality performance of the new supplier given prior lev- 
els of epistemic uncertainty? 
Using Eq. (3.6) we find that the optimal investment to improve 
the quality of the new supplier is 15 . 85 v when the effectiveness 
rate of an improvement activity is γ = 0 . 1 , meaning that we would 
expect to invest up to nearly sixteen times the buyer loss of a non- 
conformance in improving supplier non-conformance rate. If the 
effectiveness rate of an activity is γ = 0 . 5 , then the optimal value 
of investment decreases to 6 . 40 v . Consistent with Proposition 1 , 
we find that optimal investment in improvement activities of the 
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Fig. 4. (a) Prior distribution of uncertainty in the true non-conformance rate and (b) predictive distribution of number of non-conforming parts conditional on at least one 
non-conformance for the new supplier. 
new supplier is lower for higher effectiveness rates. Note that the 
expected profits are 22 . 97 v and 40 . 44 v , respectively. 
However, these are expected profits. Above we noted the pat- 
tern of variation shown in the prior distribution. If the true non- 
conformance rate of the new supplier is low (i.e. realised from the 
left hand tail of the empirical prior distribution) then there re- 
mains a risk that a loss will be incurred by implementing the im- 
provement activity. For example, if the true non-conformance rate 
is λ < 0.05 for an effectiveness rate of γ = 0 . 1 then the probabil- 
ity of making a loss is 0.51; whereas if λ < 0.15 for γ = 0 . 5 then 
the probability of making a loss is 0.46. We highlight these insights 
because they allow managers to appreciate the level of risk asso- 
ciated with making an immediate investment in supplier improve- 
ment given prior uncertainty. 
We can further examine the relationships between the effec- 
tiveness rate, optimal investment and expected profit, given the 
prior epistemic uncertainty as illustrated in Fig. 5 . Fig. 5 (a) shows 
the optimal investment and expected profit profiles, which are 
both zero until the effectiveness rate is above the investment 
threshold. Beyond this point, the expected profit increases mono- 
tonically with the effectiveness rate at a diminishing marginal rate 
of increase. Expected investment is highest at low effectiveness 
rates then decreases as the effectiveness rate increases, implying 
that the higher effectiveness requires less investment to improve 
profits. In Fig. 5 (a) the expected profit function is constrained to 
be zero for low values of the effectiveness rate, unlike the surface 
plot shown in Fig. 5 (b) where the zones of expected loss and profit 
can be identified. When effectiveness rate and optimal investment 
increase, the expected profit is highest. However, as optimal invest- 
ment and/or effectiveness decrease, so too does expected profit, 
with high investment and low effectiveness resulting in expected 
losses. 
4.4. Value of learning more about the supplier before investing in 
improvement 
So, should the company invest in activities to learn more about 
supplier quality to reduce the epistemic uncertainty about the true 
non-conformance rate? 
Table 2 
Quantiles and mean of optimal profits distribution un- 
der perfect information (in units of v ) for new suppli- 
ers to commodity group. 
Statistic Effectiveness of learning activity 
γ = 0 . 1 γ = 0 . 5 
Quantile 0.5 0 0 
0.75 0 6.02 
0.90 88.71 113.63 
0.99 915.39 956.78 
Mean 43.53 49.29 
When the effectiveness rate γ = 0 . 1 , we find the expected 
value of perfect information, that is the difference between the 
EVPI and the expected profit under prior uncertainty, to be 17 . 05 v . 
This implies that if the buyer judges it is worth spending up to 
just over seventeen times the loss incurred by a supplied non- 
conformance part to remove uncertainty about quality perfor- 
mance then the best decision is to conduct additional learning be- 
fore investing in an improvement activity. When the effectiveness 
rate is γ = 0 . 5 , the expected value of perfect information reduces 
to 5 . 44 v . 
We can further examine the likely financial consequences of 
epistemic uncertainty for the true quality performance of the new 
supplier. Table 2 shows selected quantiles and the mean of the 
distribution of optimal profits under an assumption of perfect in- 
formation corresponding to no epistemic uncertainty. The results 
presented in Table 2 indicate that investment in improvement is 
not optimal for a large proportion of suppliers new to the com- 
modity group because we find the optimal profit is zero. How- 
ever it is clear from values of the quantiles, and especially from 
the relationship of the median to the mean, that this distribu- 
tion is right skewed implying there is a small chance the new 
supplier will merit relatively large investment. For example, 1% of 
such new suppliers to the commodity group would benefit from 
an investment at least 900 times the value of a non-conforming 
part. 
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Fig. 5. Relationship between expected investment and optimal profit, given a range of effectiveness rates for supplier improvement activity. Note in (a) solid is expected 
profit and dashed is optimal investment and in (b) blue is expected profit and red is expected loss. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the 
reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
4.5. Implications of epistemic uncertainty for decision-making 
Through our modelling we aim to support supply chain man- 
agers to make informed decisions. Our goal is not to make the op- 
timal decision itself. For this reason, we have presented a selec- 
tion of results that are both typical of those shared with managers 
in the manufacturing company and illustrate the behaviour of the 
model for different inputs. We summarise our key results in rela- 
tion to the basic modelling concept shown in Fig. 1 . Let us consider 
the situation where the supply chain manager is concerned with 
an improvement activity which has an effectiveness rate judged 
to be γ = 0 . 5 . Our analysis indicates that the manager should be 
willing to invest up to 5 . 44 v to remove the epistemic uncertainty 
about the true non-conformance rate. If the costs of gathering ad- 
ditional information to learn more about supplier quality exceed 
5 . 44 v then the supply manager might decide to invest up to 6 . 40 v 
directly in the improvement activity. 
So far, our analysis has only considered the degree of epistemic 
uncertainty at the two extremes: either as estimated by the em- 
pirical prior distribution; or totally removed. To further help the 
manager develop an understanding of the impact of the degree 
of epistemic uncertainty on optimal investment levels for supplier 
improvement, we can also examine the impact of changing the 
prior standard deviation. Fig. 6 shows changes in the expected op- 
timal investment under perfect information as the standard devi- 
ation increases from zero through to 200, which is just above the 
estimated prior standard deviation of 164.71. We also examine four 
cases of changes in the prior mean around the point estimate of 
48.83 to explore part of the confidence region. As previously, we 
consider effectiveness rates of 0.1 and 0.5. We find that regard- 
less of the effectiveness rate, the expected optimal investment as 
a function of prior standard deviation is consistently less for lower 
prior mean. For equivalent prior mean and standard deviation, the 
expected optimal investment is lower when effectiveness rate is 
higher. 
In our industry example, the managers know the real value of 
the loss incurred by non-conformance and, based on their procure- 
ment knowledge, have informed opinions about the likely effec- 
tiveness rate of an improvement activity as well as the associated 
cost. Our analysis provides them with a means of expressing their 
uncertainty about supplier quality evidenced by their data and al- 
lows them to investigate options for supplier development and for 
information seeking activities with an understanding of the inher- 
ent risks to inform their decision. 
5. Discussion 
Our research has been motivated by engagement with industry 
practice and addresses an important academic topic on the value 
of information in supplier development. Consequently we believe 
we have developed a modelling framework that is both useful to 
supply chain managers and makes a scientific contribution. Our 
practical motivation has led us to frame a distinctive decision prob- 
lem where we focus upon the buyer’s dilemma of investing in 
activities to develop supplier quality performance and we aim to 
make effective and efficient use of available industry data, both 
empirical and judgemental. Hence we have presented a modelling 
solution that fills a gap in the literature between the management 
considerations of the supplier development process and the sci- 
ence of mathematically modelling abstract decision problems us- 
ing, for example, stochastic programming or game theoretical ap- 
proaches. 
5.1. Conclusions and contributions 
Practically, our modelling process has proved valuable to the in- 
dustry practitioners with whom we have been collaborating since 
they need to allocate their limited resources to a range of devel- 
opment activities in the context of an extensive number of suppli- 
ers. Importantly, by focusing on the expected value of perfect infor- 
mation we help to quickly identify those new suppliers for which 
there will be no economic benefit in obtaining any further infor- 
mation before the actual improvement investment and those oth- 
ers for which further information is essential. This type of decision 
aid is critical for prime companies with large supply bases. 
Scientifically, our major contributions and insights are as fol- 
lows. We provide closed form solutions for the optimal level of in- 
vestment and expected profit under no and perfect information. 
We establish that the optimal investment level in supplier im- 
provement does not have a monotonic relationship with the ef- 
fectiveness rate of that activity. Through Theorem 1 we have pro- 
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Fig. 6. Relationship between the expected optimal investment under perfect information and the prior standard deviation as measure of epistemic uncertainty when effec- 
tiveness rate is controlled to be (a) γ = 0 . 1 and (b) γ = 0 . 5 . 
vided distribution-free results on the relationship between mean 
optimal investment levels and uncertainty of the prior distribu- 
tion. Mean investment level before the learning stage will inform 
budgeting, as it provides a prediction on the expected amount of 
investment to a supplier that will be required post due-diligence. 
We have shown that, ceteris paribus, we would reserve the least 
amount of resources for the suppliers for whom we have the great- 
est uncertainty. This may seem counter-intuitive as one might ex- 
pect to reserve extra resources for improvement for those suppliers 
about which there is greater uncertainty. However, we stress that 
the budgeting of reserves is made in advance of learning activi- 
ties and the actual investment in the supplier will be determined 
only after further information has been collected. We provide an 
analytical expression for the EVPI that can be used to assess the 
benefits of learning more about supplier quality processes before 
investing in improvement activities. We also derive and evalu- 
ate an approximation to the EVPI in the form of an upper and 
lower bound, which supports practical computations within stan- 
dard software, such as spreadsheets. By creating a visual represen- 
tation of the relationships between expected profit, effectiveness 
and optimal investment, and examining the distribution of optimal 
profit for a given rate of effectiveness, we can communicate the 
impact of uncertainty on the risks associated with making deci- 
sions to managers, as shown in the industry example reported in 
Section 4 . 
We reflect upon our insights in relation to the proposi- 
tions made by Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig, Marucheck, and Metters 
(2007) mentioned in Section 2 . Although formed from an extensive 
literature review in the context of inventory management, these 
propositions also express more widely understood characteristics 
of value of information, hence providing a suitable level at which 
to consider the implications of our theoretical findings. Our mod- 
elling framework is useful in situations when a decision is likely 
to be sensitive to uncertainty since management support would 
not be required if (nearly) perfect information exists about the 
true non-conformance rate since the need to invest, or not, in a 
supplier would be obvious. Therefore we are consistent with the 
proposition that sensitivity of the decision to uncertainty moder- 
ates the relationship between the level of uncertainty and VOI. We 
find, although have not shown, that the expected value of per- 
fect information increases as the prior variance increases, consis- 
tent with the proposition that VOI will be larger when uncertainty 
is greater. Learning activities are intended to reduce the epistemic 
uncertainty from the prior level, but the rate of reduction will de- 
pend on the activity and so vary between activities. Better learn- 
ing will be achieved when the prior distribution shifts in location 
towards good or poor quality levels with less spread and this is in 
line with the proposition that the VOI increases with respect to the 
level of marginal information. Our approach is predicated upon the 
view that information has value if it has the potential to change 
decisions. Our effectiveness rate of a supplier improvement activ- 
ity essentially provides a mapping from the current to an intended 
quality performance state of the supplier and so corresponds to 
a supplier’s ability to respond to buyer-led improvement activities 
given operating constraints. 
5.2. Limitations and further work 
We have focused upon deriving analytical expressions for the 
value of perfect information in the context of supplier develop- 
ment investment decisions. This presumes all epistemic uncer- 
tainty is removed and so practically the expected value of per- 
fect information only provides the supply chain manager with an 
upper limit of how much to spend on learning. We can envis- 
age situations where the manager might consider various activ- 
ities to learn about supplier quality, implying that reduction in 
epistemic uncertainty about the true non-conformance rate might 
vary according to the characteristics of different activities. Thus 
we may obtain more, but not necessarily perfect, information. 
Our modelling framework can accommodate this situation allow- 
ing the manager to assess the levels of uncertainty associated with 
the non-conformance rate following a learning activity to deter- 
mine whether it is cost effective. However, we may be required 
to use simulations to assess situations where partial information is 
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gained, learning is not perfect and residual epistemic uncertainty 
remains. 
We have focused upon assessing the upper limit of a further 
reduction in epistemic uncertainty because we were motivated by 
the challenge posed by the industrial project. Our industry partners 
were not concerned with the option of delaying key learning activ- 
ities; instead they were interested in whether or not to implement 
the learning activities, such as site visits and additional audits dur- 
ing the early phase of supplier relations. Hence our focus has been 
on obtaining the expected value of perfect information as an upper 
limit for all further data gathering processes, which would include 
real options. A real option approach to this problem would be in- 
teresting to develop more formally and would be appropriate to 
modelling partial information, insofar as another branch could be 
added to the decision tree to represent a delay in the decision to 
invest and to consider the NPV of the associated costs and benefits 
to such an alternative. 
We have focused upon decisions relating to a supplier newly 
integrated to a company’s supply base in a context where the lead 
times allow for both learning and improvement activities to be 
initiated before the regular supply of parts starts. However, a re- 
lated problem is that of developing existing suppliers with whom 
the company has a past relationship. Conceptually, our Bayesian 
stochastic modelling framework supports decisions regarding ex- 
isting suppliers since it is possible to determine appropriate prob- 
ability distributions using relevant historical data for the supplier 
of interest. 
We have assumed a Gamma prior distribution. Our choice is 
aligned with our underlying probability model, which is suffi- 
ciently flexible to represent many epistemic uncertainty scenarios. 
We make the common assumption that non-conformances follow a 
Poisson distribution. The assumptions support the mathematics of 
the methods developed and can be validated using standard sta- 
tistical model checks. However, now that our framework has been 
articulated, a future challenge is to develop a wider class of proba- 
bility models that might be suitable to capture different supplier 
data patterns. This might be especially useful if we extend the 
set of performance characteristics beyond quality to, for example, 
late deliveries, or consider situations when there is anticipated im- 
provement in supplier quality as might be expected for start-up 
companies or new production technologies. 
The EVPI can be expanded to assess the value of learning about 
the effectiveness parameter γ . Assessing the uncertainty about γ
may be complicated by the confounding effect of the supplier’s 
willingness to engage in development activities. Additionally, when 
there is value in knowing the effectiveness of an intervention prior 
to engagement then learning about both the non-conformance and 
effectiveness rates is needed to assess the net impact. Develop- 
ing a bivariate model to simultaneously assess the EVPI for both 
non-conformance rate and improvement effectiveness would al- 
low the synergies of learning within activities and the depen- 
dency between the uncertainties to be analysed. Modelling the 
epistemic uncertainty in the effectiveness rate within the model 
also presents additional challenges for elicitation of the prior. 
We express the buyer loss due to a non-conforming part sup- 
plied as an unknown parameter, which is typical in the litera- 
ture. For example, Ketzenberg, Rosenzweig, Marucheck, and Met- 
ters (2007) find that few studies in an inventory management con- 
text report total costs of scenarios considered in value of infor- 
mation analysis in the inventory context. We made this modelling 
choice partly because of the challenge of accessing financial data 
and estimating such costs accurately, but also because we found 
that expressing choices relative to this loss is more useful to sup- 
ply chain managers since it accords with their practice on penal- 
ties. There is a need to provide further guidance in the articulation 
of these costs even if only for applications support, since we know 
from our theoretical and empirical work that they will also impact 
the optimal decision. 
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Appendix A 
Let N i denote the number of non-conformances realised in the 
i th future time epoch, v i denote the value of a non-conformance 
realised in the i th epoch, t i denote the exposure to risk in the i th 
epoch, and r denote the discount for one epoch. As before x is the 
one-off investment made at time 0 and γ is the effectiveness rate. 
Then we can express the profit expression in Eq. (3.4) as the NPV 
of profit, P , as follows 
P = 
∑ 
∀ i 
v i N i (1 − e 
−γ x ) 
(1 + r) i 
− x 
The expectation of P with respect to N i is given by 
P = 
∑ 
∀ i 
v i 
α
β
t i (1 − e 
−γ x ) 
(1 + r) i 
− x = 
α
β
(1 − e −γ x ) 
∑ 
∀ i 
v i t i 
(1 + r) i 
− x 
which can be re-expressed as shown below in the form consistent 
with the expression in Eq. (3.5) . 
E[ P ] = 
α
β
(1 − e −γ x ) v t − x, 
where v t = 
∑ 
∀ i 
v i t i 
(1+ r) i 
. 
Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 1 . 
x ∗ ≡
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
)
γ
, 
dx ∗
dγ
≡
1 − ln ( v tγ ) − ln 
(
α
β
)
γ 2 
ε = 
γ
x ∗
dx ∗
dγ
= 
1 − ln ( v tγ ) − ln 
(
α
β
)
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
) = 1 
ln ( v tγ ) + ln 
(
α
β
) − 1 
Proof of Proposition 2 . 
First we establish the following expression which we use of in 
the derivation of the proof: 
∞ ∫ 
1 
z j 
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
Ŵ( α) 
dz = 
Ŵ( α + j ) 
Ŵ( α) 
(
β
v tγ
) j 
∞ ∫ 
1 
(
β
v tγ
)α+ j 
z α+ j−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
Ŵ( α + j ) 
dz 
= 
Ŵ( α + j ) 
Ŵ( α) 
(
β
v tγ
) j 
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + j, 
β
v tγ
))
. 
where F 
(
1 ;α + j, β
v tγ
)
is the cumulative distribution function of 
a Gamma distribution evaluated at 1 with shape parameter α + j
and scale parameter β
v tγ . 
Note that: 
F 
(
1 ;α + j, 
β
v tγ
)
= 
(
β
v tγ
)α+ j 
e −
β
v tγ
Ŵ( α + j ) 
∞ ∑ 
k =0 
(
β
v tγ
)k 
k ∏ 
k 1=0 
( α + j + k 1 ) 
. 
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Table C.3 
Ratio of logarithm of upper bound (UB) to true EVPI over simulated parameter ranges. 
Effectiveness rate γ Shape parameter range α Scale parameter range β Min ln ( UB 
EVPI ) α value at min β value at min Max ln ( 
UB 
EVPI ) α value at max β value at max 
0.1 [0.001,0.1] [0.001,0.1] 0.588 0.1 0.001 16.797 0.001 0.1 
0.1 [0.001,0.1] [0.1,1] 7.489 0.1 0.1 26.522 0.01 1 
0.1 [0.001,0.1] [1,10] 21.858 0.1 1 123.074 0.01 10 
0.1 [0.1,1] [0.001,0.1] 0.125 1 0.01 7.489 0.1 0.1 
0.1 [0.1,1] [0.1,1] 2.339 1 0.1 21.858 0.1 1 
0.1 [0.1,1] [1,10] 15.867 1 1 118.364 0.1 10 
0.1 [1,10] [0.001,0.1] 0.009 10 0.01 2.339 1 0.1 
0.1 [1,10] [0.1,1] 0.125 10 0.1 15.867 1 1 
0.1 [1,10] [1,10] 3.86 10 1 110.875 1 10 
0.5 [0.001,0.1] [0.001,0.1] 0.116 0.1 0.001 13.277 0.001 0.1 
0.5 [0.001,0.1] [0.1,1] 3.907 0.1 0.1 14.607 0.01 1 
0.5 [0.001,0.1] [1,10] 9.93 0.1 1 38.418 0.01 10 
0.5 [0.1,1] [0.001,0.1] 0.011 1 0.01 3.907 0.1 0.1 
0.5 [0.1,1] [0.1,1] 0.215 1 0.1 9.93 0.1 1 
0.5 [0.1,1] [1,10] 15.867 1 1 118.364 0.1 10 
0.5 [1,10] [0.001,0.1] 0.001 10 0.01 0.215 1 0.1 
0.5 [1,10] [0.1,1] 0.011 10 0.1 4.508 1 1 
0.5 [1,10] [1,10] 0.186 10 1 27.37 1 10 
0.9 [0.001,0.1] [0.001,0.1] 0.06 0.1 0.001 12.354 0.001 0.1 
0.9 [0.001,0.1] [0.1,1] 2.973 0.1 0.1 12.5 0.01 1 
0.9 [0.001,0.1] [1,10] 7.807 0.1 1 27.916 0.01 10 
0.9 [0.1,1] [0,0.1] 0.001 1 0.01 2.973 0.1 0.1 
0.9 [0.1,1] [0.1,1] 0.039 1 0.1 7.807 0.1 1 
0.9 [0.1,1] [1,10] 15.867 1 1 118.364 0.1 10 
0.9 [1,10] [0,001,0.1] 0 10 0.01 0.039 1 0.1 
0.9 [1,10] [0.1,1] 0.001 10 0.1 2.427 1 1 
0.9 [1,10] [1,10] 0.017 10 1 17.205 1 10 
Now we derive the main result. Let Z = v tγ. Since a Gamma ran- 
dom variable is closed under scale transformation we can express 
Z ∼ Gamma 
(
α, β
v tγ
)
. We seek the following: 
E Z [ E [ P ; x PI | Z ] ] = 
∞ ∫ 
1 
z − 1 − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
Ŵ( α) 
dz 
= 
∞ ∫ 
1 
(
z − 1 + 
∞ ∑ 
i =1 
( −1 ) 
i ( z−1 ) i 
i 
)
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
Ŵ( α) 
dz = 
∞ ∫ 
1 
z − 1 + 
∞ ∑ 
i =1 
(−1) i 
i ∑ 
j=0 
( −1 ) i − j ( i j ) z j 
i 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
Ŵ( α) 
dz 
= 
v tγ α
β
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + 1 , β
v tγ
))
− 1 + F 
(
1 ;α, β
v tγ
)
γ
+ 
∞ ∑ 
i =1 
i ∑ 
j=0 
( i −1 ) ! 
( i − j ) ! j! ( −1 ) 
j 
(
v tγ
β
) j Ŵ( α+ j ) 
Ŵ( α) 
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α + j, β
v tγ
))
γ
which gives an expression for the EVPI. 
Proof of Theorem 1 . 
The optimal level of investment under perfect information is 
given by X PI = max ( 0 , ln ( υtγ) ) . The expectation of X PI when the 
non-conformance rate is known to exceed the threshold can be 
expressed as in the following. 
E 
[
X PI 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
= ln ( υtγ ) + E 
[
ln ( ) 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
Consider the following Taylor Expansion of ln ( ) about 
μ
> 1 υtγ
= E 
[

∣∣ > 1 υtγ ], where  is a random variable de- 
fined on the positive real numbers with variance σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
= 
E 
[
( −μ) 2 
∣∣ > 1 υtγ ]. 
ln ( ) = ln 
(
μ> 1 υtγ
)
+ 
(
−μ> 1 υtγ
)
μ> 1 υtγ
+ o 
((
−μ> 1 υtγ
)2 )
∗
We make two observations: 
i) As ln ( ) is a concave function then we know ln ( ) ≤
ln 
(
μ
> 1 υtγ
)
+ 
(
−μ
> 1 υtγ
)
μ
> 1 υtγ
ii) Taking the expectation of both sides of ( ∗) results in the follow- 
ing: 
E 
[
ln ( ) 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
= ln 
(
μ> 1 υtγ
)
+ o 
(
E 
[(
−μ> 1 υtγ
)2 ∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
])
Re-arranging we have the following bound. 
ln 
(
μ> 1 υtγ
)
− E 
[
ln ( ) 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
= o 
(
σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
)
. 
So from observation i) we know that 
E 
[
X PI 
∣∣∣∣ > 1 υtγ
]
≤ ln 
(
υtγμ> 1 υtγ
)
and only achieves equality in the deterministic case, i.e. when 
σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
= 0 . 
From observation ii) we know that the expected investment de- 
creases as uncertainty increases, i.e. as σ 2 
> 1 υtγ
increases. 
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Proof of Proposition 3 . 
Following the derivation of Proposition 2 , we seek to find: 
E Z [ E [ P ; x PI | Z ] ] = 
∞ ∫ 
1 
z − 1 − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
Ŵ( α) 
dz 
= 
∞ ∫ 
1 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
Ŵ( α) 
d z −
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1 
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
γŴ( α) 
d z ≤
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0 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
Ŵ( α) 
dz −
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, 
β
v tγ
))
= v t 
α
β
−
( α) − ln 
(
β
v tγ
)
γ
−
(
1 − F 
(
1 ;α, 
β
v tγ
))
. 
Proof of Proposition 4 . 
The difference between the EVPI and the upper bound pro- 
vided in Proposition 3 comes from integration over the range [0, 
∞ ) rather than [1, ∞ ). As such, the error is given by: 
error = 
1 ∫ 
0 
z − ln ( z ) 
γ
(
β
v tγ
)α
z α−1 e −z 
β
v tγ
Ŵ( α) 
dz 
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γ
(
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)α
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γ
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β
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(
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(
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−
β
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(
β
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1 ∫ 
0 
(
z α − z α−1 ln ( z ) 
)(
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(
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−
β
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dz 
= 
(
β
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)α
Ŵ( α) γ
1 ∫ 
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(
z α − z α−1 ln ( z ) −
(
1 − e 
−
β
v tγ
)
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(
1 − e 
−
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)
z α ln ( z ) 
)
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(
β
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)α
Ŵ( α) γ
ln ( α) 
(
1 − e 
−
β
v tγ
)
α2 ( α + 2 ) + e 
−
β
v tγ α3 + 
(
2 + e 
−
β
v tγ
)
α2 + 3 α + 2 
α2 
(
α2 + 3 α + 2 
) . 
Appendix C 
The purpose of our numerical study is to understand the loss 
of accuracy of the UB as an approximation to the EVPI. Hence, 
we focus upon the region where the bound is likely to perform 
poorly, informed by our theoretical results. Setting v = t = 1 , we 
simulate combinations of the remaining parameters in the follow- 
ing ranges: 0.001 ≤ α ≤ 1; 0.001 ≤ β ≤ 10; and for 0.1 ≤ γ ≤ 1.0. 
Table C.3 summarises the results for effectiveness rates of 0.1, 0.5, 
and 0.9, and selected 27 partitions of the parameter space for the 
shape and scale parameters. Reported are the minimum and max- 
imum values of the ratio of the UB to the EVPI in each partition. 
More than 20,0 0 0 simulations have been run in total to calculate 
these statistics. Lesser (greater) accuracy is implied when the log 
ratio of the UB to the true EVPI is larger (smaller). By showing the 
maximums and minimums of the log ratio over the controlled pa- 
rameter intervals, we gain insight into the best and worst accuracy 
within each simulation set. 
Our results show that the accuracy of the UB increases as the 
shape parameter α increases, which is consistent with Corollary 1 . 
In addition, the accuracy of the UB also increases for increasing 
values of effectiveness rate, γ , and decreasing values of the scale 
parameter β . Therefore, the upper bound becomes a poorer ap- 
proximation as the effectiveness rate reduces and the values of the 
scale parameter increases. This implies that for α > 1 and β < 0.1 
then the error between the approximation given by the UB and the 
true EVPI can be as high as a factor of 10. 
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